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1. Introduction 
Apraxia is traditionally defined as a disorder of skilled movement that cannot be attributed 
to elementary sensorimotor deficit, aphasia or severe mental deterioration (De Renzi, 1989). 
This negative definition has led to integrate within the same framework a multitude of 
relatively different clinical manifestations, which have little in common with the kind of 
deficits to which it was originally applied (e.g., gaze apraxia, gait apraxia, trunk apraxia). 
These forms probably concern automatic movements and, therefore, will not be treated here. 
It is now largely admitted that some clinical signs are particularly useful for the diagnosis. 
First, the disorder affects the two sides of the body, even though the brain lesions are 
generally unilateral and more particularly located in the left (dominant) hemisphere. 
Second, the errors made by apraxics vary depending on the conditions of testing. For 
instance, apraxics can succeed in many circumstances, but fail when the movement must be 
executed to the clinician’s request. In this frame, three categories of movement are regarded 
as relevant to the evaluation: Imitation of meaningless postures, pantomime production (i.e., 
demonstration of the use of a tool without the tool in hand) and actual tool use. Apraxia has 
been, and is still, subject to intense debate notably about its autonomy from elementary 
sensorimotor deficits and from higher-level cognitive processes. As a result, neurologists 
and neuropsychologists alike are commonly uncertain about the good way of assessing and 
interpreting it. In this chapter, we propose to address different issues relative to the notion 
of apraxia in light of recent developments made in the field. 
The first part of the chapter will introduce two authors who made a significant, historical 
contribution to the notion of apraxia, namely Hugo Karl Liepmann and Norman 
Geschwind. Then, in the second part, we will present the cognitive models of apraxia that 
have emerged since 1980 (Buxbaum, 2001; Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1991; Roy & Square, 
1985). Third, we will discuss recent data collected by Georg Goldenberg that raise a certain 
number of controversies about the cognitive models mentioned above (Goldenberg, 1995, 
2003, 2009). In the sake of clarity, our discussion will deal with apraxic manifestations 
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assessed only with tasks of imitation of meaningless gestures, pantomime production and 
actual tool use. Besides discussing the psychological bases of apraxia, lesion sites associated 
with the different forms or apraxia will also be treated all along the paper. We hope that this 
chapter will help clinicians and students to better understand what apraxia is and how to 
evaluate it. 
2. Historical background 
2.1 Liepmann (1908, 1920) 
We owe the first description of apraxia to Jackson (1866), who observed a motor intentional 
deficit in aphasic patients. Those patients were unable to move the tongue or lips on 
command, but could carry out these movements in an automatic movement sequence such 
as swallowing or eating. Jackson observed that this automatic-voluntary dissociation was 
not restricted to muscles of the facial region, since some of those aphasic patients were also 
unable to move their right, non-plegic hand on command while the same actions could be 
performed correctly in a spontaneous way. Although the first observations of apraxic 
patients are credited to Jackson, it was Steinthal (1871; see also Gogol, 1873) who coined the 
term apraxia. He described the case of an aphasic patient who attempted to write by holding 
a pencil upside down, or manipulated a fork and a knife as if he had never used them 
before. Steinthal stressed that it was not the ability to perform movements of extremities 
which was defective, but rather the relationship between the movements and the 
manipulated object, thereby suggesting that the absence of action (i.e., “a-praxia”) might 
result from a perceptual deficit affecting object use recognition.  
These observations led authors to hypothesize that apraxia might be a single neurological 
syndrome to be distinguished from agnosia, aphasia or asymbolia. Nevertheless, clinical 
and experimental evidence was still not enough to support this hypothesis. In fact, many 
authors thought at that time that it was hard to differentiate between apraxia and 
elementary sensorimotor deficits such as paresis. Independence of apraxia from pure motor 
deficits was supported by the observation of a 48-year-imperial councillor, the patient MT, 
by Liepmann (1900). MT was aphasic and showed clear-cut apraxia of the right hand. The 
deficit affected the movements of right extremities as well as movements of the head, the 
face and the tongue. MT was however able to perform properly, with his left hand, gestures 
on verbal command and upon imitation, including tool use. Verbal comprehension, visual 
recognition and global intellectual functioning were largely preserved. Liepmann proposed 
the term “motor apraxia” to describe this particular impairment.  
In 1908, Liepmann published a study including 42 right brain-damaged (RBD) patients and 
47 left brain-damaged (LBD) patients. He found apraxia in 20 out of 47 LBD patients. He 
also stressed that it did not occur at all in the right hands of the group of RBD patients. 
Liepmann proposed to call “sympathetic apraxia” this kind of apraxia which accompanies 
right hemiplegia. Moreover, 14 out of 20 LBD patients with apraxia were aphasic, but 6 were 
not. So, he argued that the left cerebral hemisphere is dominant not only for language but 
also for motor control. He also suggested that apraxia often accompanies aphasia, but is 
independent of it. In the meanwhile, Pick (1905) reported the case of an aphasic patient who 
was able to understand simple instructions, name objects and explain their functional use, 
but could use a knife to comb his hair, put a match to the mouth in an attempt to smoke it or 
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encounter severe difficulties to demonstrate how to use a key or a pair of scissors. Pick 
interpreted this disorder as a sign of motor apraxia given that the patient showed intact 
knowledge of functional uses of objects. 
On the basis of these findings, Liepmann (1908, 1920) made the first clinical and anatomical 
synthesis of apraxia. He thought skilled movements to be supported by the creation of 
movement formulae in the whole posterior cortex. Movement formulae are constituted by 
acoustic or visual images of the action. To perform skilled movements, movement formulae 
produced by the posterior brain have to be associated via cortical connections with the 
innervatory patterns stored in the left sensorimotor region. When the left hand has to carry 
out the movement, the information is transferred via the corpus callosum to the right 
sensorimotor region. In sum, there is only one mechanism for skilled movements, which can 
nevertheless be impaired at three levels, thus producing three distinct forms of apraxia 
(Figure 1).  
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Fig. 1. First synthesis of Liepmann (1908) displaying the mechanism of apraxia. Explanations 
are given in the text. Adapted from Goldenberg (2009). 
First, patients with “Ideational Apraxia” (IA or motor apraxia for Pick) fail to generate 
movement formulae and, therefore, show impairment in the real and pantomimed use of 
tools. Patients may however perform normally when provided with the idea of the gesture, 
such as when asked to carry out movements upon imitation. It was first thought to be a 
severe form of ideomotor apraxia (see below), but Liepmann confirmed its independence in 
1920 and associated this disorder with lesions of the whole posterior cortex and, more 
particularly, the left posterior regions. Second, in “IdeoMotor Apraxia” (IMA or motor 
apraxia in the princeps study of 1900), movement formulae are intact but can no longer 
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guide the innervatory patterns. In short, the patient knows what he has to do, but does not 
know how to do it. Patients with IMA show predominantly difficulties to perform 
meaningful gestures on verbal command and on imitation. Actual tool use is partly spared 
because of the adaptation of movements to external constraints. This form of apraxia was 
associated with the destruction of fibres connecting posterior brain regions to the frontal 
sensorimotor regions (callosal, frontal and parietal). Given that these fibres pass below the 
parietal cortex, Liepmann suggested that deep lesions of the inferior parietal lobe and the 
supramarginal gyrus may cause IMA (see Goldenberg, 2009). Third, “Motor Apraxia” 
(melo-kinetic apraxia in the paper of 1908) corresponds with the impairment of innervatory 
patterns. Contrary to IA and IAM that affect movements of both hands, motor apraxia is 
unilateral and occurs regardless of the conditions of evaluation (no automatic-voluntary 
dissociation). Motor apraxia is associated with lesions of frontal sensorimotor regions.  
2.2 Geschwind (1965, 1975) 
The disconnection approach was partly initiated by the description of the imperial 
counsellor MT by Liepmann (1900). The problem inherent to this description is that, unlike 
the patient MT, unilateral non-sympathetic apraxia affects more frequently the left upper 
limb than the right one. Geschwind (1965) developed his theoretical model of apraxia on this 
basis. Geschwind and Kaplan (1962) discussed the case of a patient with an extensive 
infarction of corpus callosum, who was able to write correctly with the right hand but not 
with the left hand, which did not show an elementary sensorimotor disturbance. Moreover, 
the patient could perform gestures on verbal command (pantomime) with the right hand 
but frequently failed to carry them out with the left hand. Importantly, he could imitate the 
movement made by the examiner as well as use objects correctly with either hand. The 
hypothesis that the failures of this patient resulted from a general conceptual disturbance 
was ruled out by the fact that the patient could pretend to use objects with the right hand. 
Instead, given that the difficulties occurred when the patient was asked to perform actions 
to command, Geschwind and Kaplan interpreted these disturbances as the effects of 
disconnection of the right motor cortex from the speech area and suggested that the 
extensive infarction of the corpus callosum must be regarded as the cause of the symptoms.  
Geschwind (1965) stressed that this case did not represent the difficulties which usually 
accompany left unilateral apraxia. Indeed, impairment is generally not limited to gesture on 
verbal command and also occurs when patients are requested to imitate or to actually use 
tools. This is consistent with the first description of the clinical manifestation of extensive 
disconnection of the corpus callosum by Liepmann and Maas (1907). Their patient, Ochs, 
had a right hemiplegia. He could not write with his left hand and failed to perform many 
actions on verbal command and did not improve on imitation. Ochs also frequently 
mishandled objects placed in his left hand. So, Geschwind (1965, p. 606) emphasized that 
“the designation of “apraxic” is an inadequate one unless the stimulus conditions are 
specified…Rather than use the term “apraxia” it is therefore preferable to specify the 
stimulus-response combinations which fail”. 
A few years later, Geschwind (1975) proposed a neo-associationist model which diverted 
from Liepmann’s theory in that he replaced the movement formulae by the verbal command 
which elicits motor actions by using a neural substrate similar to that used by Wernicke to 
language processing (Figure 2). Sensorial centres are directly linked to motor centres and 
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apraxia is viewed as an interruption of the translation of sensorial stimulations into motor 
inputs. The Wernicke area is connected to the left motor association area by the arcuate 
fasciculus, and the left motor association area is linked to the left primary motor area. When 
a person is requested to perform a gesture on verbal command with the right hand, this 
pathway is used. If a person has to use the left hand, information is transferred from the left 
motor association area to the right motor association area and then to the right primary 
motor area. For Geschwind, lesions in the region of the arcuate fasciculus and 
supramarginal gyrus disconnect Wernicke area from motor association areas. So, patients 
with lesions in this area can comprehend verbal commands but show difficulties in carrying 
out movements to command with either hand. Gesture-to-command but not imitation 
requires left hemisphere language processing. So, given that many LBD patients have no 
right hemisphere lesion, they should be able to imitate, but cannot. To account for this 
discrepancy, Geschwind suggested that the left arcuate fasciculus is also dominant for 
visuomotor connections. Finally, callosal lesions produce a unilateral apraxia of the left 
hand, as described by Geschwind and Kaplan (1962) and Liepmann and Maas (1907).  
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F 
 
Fig. 2. Neo-associationnist model of Geschwind (1975). A, motor association cortex; B, 
primary motor cortex; C, Wernicke area; D, arcuate fasciculus; E, visual association cortex; F, 
visual cortex. Adapted from Geschwind (1975).  
Tool use impairments, central to IA, are not directly concerned by this model whose 
primary focus is IMA. Liepmann and Maas (1907) observed that Ochs failed in some very 
simple object manipulations, yet could button his clothing blindfolded. They attributed this 
to the ability of the isolated sensory and motor cortex to do over-learned tasks without the 
mediation of vision. This observation corroborated previous ones indicating that LBD 
patients with apraxia are commonly better at demonstrating the real use of tools than at 
pantomiming. In line with this, Geschwind (1965) suggested that for the use of tools the 
pathway from primary somesthetic to primary motor cortex may be via association cortex, 
as in the case of connexions of other modalities to the motor system. Sparing of this 
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pathway, as it is generally the case in LBD patients, might leave object handling totally 
unaffected. Given that much knowledge about tools is acquired visually, visuo-motor 
connections might inhibit somesthetic-motor connections, so that patients may nevertheless 
show some difficulties to demonstrate the actual use of tools to the sight of tools. But, as 
Liepmann and Maas (1907) stressed, these difficulties might be considerably reduced if 
patients are asked to use tools blindfolded.  
3. Cognitive models of apraxia 
In 1980s, there has been a renewal of interest for the study of apraxia with the emergence of 
cognitive models which intend to describe the different levels of processing involved in 
gestural production, leaving aside the issue of neuroanatomical locations. All these models 
share a common feature inspired from the disconnection approach of Geschwind: There 
would be several possible routes for producing gestures, and even the same gesture. This is 
the famous multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis, which diverts from Liepmann for whom 
there was only one mechanism. Nevertheless, unlike Geschwind, cognitive models do not 
conceive of apraxic manifestations as resulting from disconnections between sensorial and 
motor centres. They assume, as Liepmann thought, that there are several processing stages 
which translate sensorial codes into motor codes. In broad terms, the production of a gesture 
would be generally based upon conceptual processing (indirect, lexical route). But, the 
system would be flexible, so that conceptual processing could be bypassed (direct, non-
lexical route). We discuss in more detail these models in the following lines.  
3.1 Roy and Square (1985) 
The model of Roy and Square (1985) is thought to rely on the operation of conceptual and 
production processes. The conceptual system provides an abstract representation of action 
relevant to limb praxis. Three types of knowledge are incorporated in this system. The first 
is knowledge of objects and tools in terms of the action and functions they serve. This kind of 
knowledge may have internalized linguistic referents (knowing that a knife is a piece of 
cutlery which can be used with a fork to eat). The second is knowledge of actions independent of 
tools or objects but into which tools or objects may be incorporated. This kind of knowledge is 
decontextualized, that is, associated with any particular object. People can use this practical 
knowledge about objects based on perceptual attributes to use tools in an unusual way (a 
shoe would make a good hammer). The third is knowledge relevant to the seriation of single 
actions into a sequence. Impairment of the conceptual system would lead to difficulties in 
pantomiming the use of tools (IMA) as well as in the actual use of objects (IA). Object 
substitution (e.g., using a pencil as a comb) would be one of the main manifestations of 
patients with defective conceptual knowledge.  
While the conceptual system encompasses knowledge for action, the production system 
provides the mechanisms for movements. At one level, action may be directed by 
generalized programs representing actions and which might be of ecological importance 
(hammering, stirring). These programs are not specific to any particular unit (hand, foot) but 
can guide any of these units in the production of the action. Importantly, all of the 
information relevant to action would not be “in the head”. Much information is also “out 
there” in the environment, thereby suggesting that the environment could also control the 
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movement through bottom-up processing. Roy and Square (1985) suggested that errors in 
performing the sequence of movements in the sequence (omission, repetition) as well as 
clumsiness may be caused by impairment of the production system.  
3.2 Rothi, Ochipa, and Heilman (1991) 
Geschwind (1965, 1975) was opposed to the idea of specific cerebral areas in which 
movement formulae are stored. Nevertheless, he never tested this hypothesis. For him, the 
left arcuate fasciculus is dominant for visuomotor connections. And, given that these fibres 
pass below the left parietal cortex, deep lesions of the parietal lobe cause IMA. The corollary 
is that patients with damage to arcuate fasciculus and parietal lobe should encounter 
difficulties not only to produce gestures but also to recognize the gestures performed by 
others (only one form of IMA). By contrast, if the connection between the visual association 
cortex and the motor association cortex is relayed by movement formulae contained in the 
left parietal lobe, then lesions anterior to this cerebral region should cause impaired gesture 
production without impairment in gesture recognition.  
The study of Heilman, Rothi, and Valenstein (1982) aimed at testing these predictions. They 
examined 20 LBD patients who were classified into four groups according to the locus of 
lesion (anterior vs. posterior) and whether or not they were apraxic. Apraxia was assessed 
by asking patients to perform 15 gestures on verbal command (12 pantomimed acts and 3 
meaningful gestures such as hitchhiking). Some patients did not have a CT scan because 
their cerebral infarctions occurred before the advent of CT. So, they classified the subjects as 
fluent or non-fluent based on spontaneous speech. Because patients with fluent aphasia 
have generally posterior lesions and those with non-fluent aphasia have commonly anterior 
lesions, they used this indicator to determine the locus of lesions. Four groups were thus 
formed: 1, apraxic patients with anterior lesions/non-fluent aphasia; 2, apraxic patients with 
posterior lesions/fluent aphasia; 3, non-apraxic patients with anterior lesions/non-fluent 
aphasia; 4, non-apraxic patients with posterior lesions/fluent aphasia. All the patients were 
asked to perform a gesture discrimination test consisted of 32 trials, each containing three 
separate videotaped pantomimed acts. Patients were instructed to discriminate the gesture 
corresponding to the verbal description of the action. Only one of the three gestures was 
correct.  
The results indicated that apraxic patients with posterior/fluent aphasia (Group 2) 
performed worse than the three other groups (Groups 1, 3 and 4), thereby suggesting that 
gesture production can be dissociated from gesture recognition and that there would be two 
different forms of IMA: The posterior form (impairment in both gesture recognition and 
gesture production: Group 2) and the anterior form (impairment in gesture production only: 
Group 1). These findings confirmed the hypothesis of movement formulae, which was 
reformulated “visuo-kinesthetic motor engrams” by Heilman et al. (1982), as well as the 
possible involvement of left inferior parietal lobe (supramarginal gyrus and angular gyrus) 
in the storage of these so-called engrams. In a subsequent study, Rothi, Heilman, and 
Watson (1985) asked 13 LBD patients to carry out a gesture discrimination test in which the 
correct gesture had to be associated with the drawing of the object. Besides corroborating 
the data obtained by Heilman et al. (1982), this study ruled out the possibility that the 
posterior type of IMA resulted from aphasia since the material used was visual and not 
verbal. 
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On the basis of these works as well as other observations of dissociation collected in the 
neuropsychological literature, Rothi et al. (1991) proposed a cognitive model of apraxia 
detailing the different processing stages required for gesture production and recognition 
(Figure 3). The different processing modules are presented in the following lines.  
 
Fig. 3. Cognitive model of apraxia of Rothi et al. (1991). Note that the model is integrated 
into a larger cognitive architecture thought to explain language deficits. Adapted from Rothi 
et al. (1991). 
The action-lexicon. Rothi et al. (1991) proposed the term “lexicon” to refer to the movement 
formulae of Liepmann (1908) and the visuokinesthetic motor engrams of Heilman et al. 
(1982). The model posits that input and output processing of praxis require division of the 
action-lexicon into an input action-lexicon (devoted to gesture recognition) and an output 
action-lexicon (devoted to gesture production). This distinction is supported by the fact that 
some patients are significantly better for recognizing or producing pantomimes on verbal 
command than for imitating them (Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1994). Indeed, spared gesture 
recognition in the presence of impaired imitation may be explained by dysfunction after 
access to the input action-lexicon. Moreover, given that pantomime production on verbal 
command is less impaired than pantomime imitation, the model assumes that spoken 
language might gain access to the output action-lexicon without having to be processed by 
the input action-lexicon.  
Input modality selectivity. Rothi et al. (1991) posited that there would be selective input into 
the action-lexicons according to modality. This proposal is based, for example, on the 
observation of some patients who are able to perform gestures to command correctly, but 
who cannot produce visually-presented gestures (optic apraxia; see Assal & Regli, 1980). On 
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the basis of these findings as well as other somewhat similar findings, the model suggests 
the existence of separate input systems for visually presented gestural information 
(imitation), visually presented objects (pantomime or actual tool use), and auditory 
presented verbal information (gestures to command).  
Non-lexical action processing or direct route. In addition to a lexically based system, the model 
assumes that there would be a non-lexical action processing system available for the 
imitation of meaningful (symbolic and transitive) as well as meaningless gestures. This 
hypothesis is notably supported by the observation of a patient who had a selective deficit 
of imitation (Mehler, 1987).  
Action semantics. The different stages of action processing were mainly isolated from 
observations of patients with IMA encountering difficulties in pantomime production or 
imitation. To account for IA, Rothi et al. (1991) stressed that actual tool use is dependent 
upon the interaction of conceptual knowledge related to tools, objects and actions, what they 
called action semantics. This proposal is consistent with that of Roy and Square (1985) that 
tool use is supported by a conceptual system (see above). 
Buxbaum (2001) 
For Rothi et al. (1991), damage to action lexicons should be accompanied by impairments in 
gesture production and comprehension and, more generally, in tasks requiring knowledge 
about tool manipulation. However, knowledge about tool function should not be impaired 
notably because this kind of knowledge would be supported by action semantics. 
Buxbaum and Saffran (2002) examined this prediction with 7 aphasic patients with IMA and 
6 aphasic patients without IMA. Apraxia was assessed by asking patients to perform 
gestures to command and on imitation (15 pantomimes and 5 symbolic gestures). Patients 
performed a picture-matching task in which they had to select among three tools the two 
tools that were the more similar to one another. In the manipulation condition, matching 
had to be done on the basis of similar manipulation (e.g., a typewriter and a piano are 
tapped with the fingertips). In the function condition, matching had to be done on the basis 
of similar function (e.g., a radio and a record player are used for listening music). The results 
indicated that apraxic patients performed worse the manipulation condition than non-
apraxic patients. The opposite pattern was obtained for the function manipulation. All of the 
7 apraxics and only 1 non-apraxic had lesions of the left frontoparietal cortex. The two 
groups did not differ in temporal lobe involvement (see also Buxbaum, Veramonti, & 
Schwartz, 2000b). 
On the basis of these findings, Buxbaum (2001) proposed an updated version of Rothi et al.’s 
(1991) model, consisting of three systems (Figure 4). The first system, the dorsal action 
system, includes a dynamic representation of the body forming the basis for calculation of 
several frames of reference centred upon the body parts. Therefore, patients with “dynamic 
apraxia” are impaired at producing pantomime, but can use tools correctly when they are 
given in hand. Imitation is also defective. This apraxia could be observed after damage in 
the dorsal frontoparietal cortex, with involvement of the superior parietal lobe particularly 
likely (Buxbaum, Giovannetti, & Libon, 2000a; Heilman et al., 1982; Heilman, Rothi, Mack, 
Feinberg, & Watson, 1986). 
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Fig. 4. Model of Buxbaum (2001). Adapted from Buxbaum (2001). 
The second system, the ventral system, would include declarative, conceptual knowledge 
about tool function. Ventral apraxia is accompanied with difficulties with actual tool use, 
and more particularly in action errors revealing conceptual problems with tool knowledge 
(misuse, tool substitution). Gesture recognition as well as imitation would be spared. This 
apraxia could also be revealed by matching tasks involving knowledge about tool function 
(see above). Temporal lobe lesions would be critical for the occurrence of ventral apraxia 
(Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Sirigu, Duhamel, & Poncet, 1991). 
The third system, the central praxis system, would be specifically involved in pantomime 
production and recognition as well as matching tasks requiring tool manipulation (see 
above). This system includes gesture engrams (the action lexicons of Rothi et al., 1991) 
which are thought as existing at the confluence of the ventral and dorsal streams because 
they contain representational features (ventral system), which are themselves dependent on 
dynamic spatiomotor processes (dorsal system). Damage to the left inferior parietal lobe 
would be critical for representational apraxia (Buxbaum, Kyle, Grossman, & Coslett, 2007; 
Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Heilman et al., 1982). For 
Buxbaum (2001, p. 452), gesture engrams have to be viewed as containing “the features of 
gestures which are invariant and critical for distinguishing a given gesture from others. For 
a hammering movement, for example, a broad oscillation from the elbow joint is critical, as 
is a clenched hand posture, and these and other similar gestural features are construed as 
forming the ‘core’ of the gesture representation”.  
4. Recent contribution to apraxia 
The multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis is central to cognitive models of apraxia. This way 
of conceiving action is very heuristic by allowing the formulation of a great number of 
hypotheses to account for patients’ difficulties. Unfortunately, this proposal is subject to a 
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severe limitation in the interpretation of disorders. How, indeed, to demonstrate that a 
deficit is associated with a single process if it can always be explained by impairment at 
other levels? By contrast, recent works have indicated that a limited number of processes 
might be involved in praxis, and that they would not be parallel, but rather orthogonal. In 
broad terms, each process might have a specific function that could not be supported by 
another process. These works will be detailed in the following lines.  
4.1 The role of conceptual knowledge for actual tool use 
Cognitive models based on the multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis generally assign 
specific information to each form of conceptual knowledge. There is, however, considerable 
confusion about the precise role of each of these different forms, given that impairment of 
each of theses forms could be easily compensated. For instance, a patient with impaired 
conceptual knowledge about tool function may nevertheless maintain the ability to actually 
use tools by activating gesture engrams (Buxbaum, 2001).  
In general, cognitive models distinguish, at a first level, sensorimotor, non-conceptual 
knowledge, about tool manipulation (i.e., visuokinesthetic motor engrams, action lexicons, 
gesture engrams) from conceptual/semantic knowledge1 about tool function (Buxbaum, 
2001; Rothi et al., 1991). At a second level, there is also a distinction between conceptual 
knowledge about the prototypical2 use of tools (for which purpose, in which context and 
with which object) and knowledge containing practical information about tools and objects 
based on perceptual attributes (e.g., a shoe would make a good hammer) (Buxbaum, 2001; 
Hodges et al., 2000; Rothi et al., 1991; Roy & Square, 1985). Different tasks have been 
developed to assess the integrity of each of these two forms. As mentioned above, 
conceptual knowledge about prototypical use can be examined with picture-matching tasks 
in which subjects are instructed to match a tool with its usual object, its typical location or 
another tool that can be used to achieve the same purpose (e.g., Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, 
Patterson, & Hodges, 2002; Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 1999; 
Hodges et al., 2000; Osiurak et al., 2009). By contrast, practical knowledge can be evaluated 
by asking patients to solve mechanical problems (Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998; 
Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; Hartmann, Goldenberg, Daumüller, & Hermsdörfer, 2005) or to 
use familiar tools in a non-conventional way (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife) (Osiurak et 
al., 2007, 2008, 2009). Note that in line with the multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis, 
damage to one of these forms of knowledge might be compensated by the other one, and 
vice versa. For example, a patient showing difficulties in determining the usual function of a 
hammer (prototypical knowledge) might nevertheless be able to demonstrate how to use it 
by activating practical knowledge based on perceptual attributes. In other words, the 
impairment of each of these forms should not necessarily be associated with tool use 
disorders. 
This prediction has however been invalidated by several studies indicating the existence of a 
strong association between practical knowledge and actual tool use. For example, 
                                                                          
1 Semantic memory is usually defined as a system that stores and retrieves information about the 
meaning of words, concepts and facts (Tulving, 1972; Warrington, 1975). 
2 In this chapter, we use the terms “conventional”, “usual”, “familiar” and “prototypical” 
interchangeably. 
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Goldenberg and Hagmann (1998) found a significant correlation in LBD patients between 
familiar tool use and mechanical problem solving (see also Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; 
Hartmann et al., 2005; Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). It has also been shown that mechanical 
problem solving skills are often disrupted in patients with cortico-basal degeneration, who 
are known to exhibit severe difficulties in activities of daily life involving the use of tools3 
(Hodges et al., 1999; Spatt, Bak, Bozeat, Patterson, & Hodges, 2002). Recently, Osiurak et al. 
(2009) asked 20 LBD patients, 11 RBD patients and 41 healthy control subjects to perform a 
familiar tool use task (screwing a screw with a screwdriver) as well as a task requiring the 
non-conventional use of tools (screwing a screw with a knife). The findings indicated that 
only LBD patients encountered difficulties in the two tasks as well as a strong correlation 
between the two tests. While a clear-cut relationship appears to be drawn between actual 
tool use and practical knowledge, such a relationship has not been observed between actual 
tool use and prototypical knowledge. Indeed, many studies have shown that brain damage 
can impair actual tool use and knowledge about the prototypical use of tools (assessed with 
picture-matching tasks) independently from each other (Bartolo, Daumüller, Della Sala, & 
Goldenberg, 2007; Bozeat et al., 2002; Buxbaum, Schwartz, & Carew, 1997; Forde & 
Humphreys, 2000; Goldenberg & Spatt, 2009; Hodges et al., 2000; Lauro-Grotto, Piccini, & 
Shallice, 1997; Negri et al., 2007; Osiurak et al., 2008, 2009; Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). 
Taken together, these findings rule out the prediction formulated above that the specific 
impairment of each form of conceptual knowledge (prototypical versus practical) should not 
cause tool use disorders. More particularly, these findings provide convincing evidence for 
the hypothesis that any situations involving the use of tools (actual use of familiar tools, 
non-conventional use of familiar tools and mechanical problem solving) might require 
practical but not prototypical knowledge. This conclusion raises the question as to the role 
of conceptual knowledge about the prototypical use for tool use. 
To account for the discrepancy between these results and the predictions derived from the 
multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis, Buxbaum et al. (1997) suggested that prototypical 
knowledge may be neither necessary nor sufficient for actual tool use. Such an account is 
nevertheless delicate since it requires explaining why the human brain would possess 
knowledge that is not relevant for action. There is another way to interpret these findings, 
but this implies ruling out the multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis by considering that 
each form of knowledge has an assigned function. In this way, Osiurak et al. (2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011) have suggested that practical knowledge – what they called “technical 
reasoning” – would be specifically devoted to the formation of representations about the 
possible physical actions on the world (see also McCloskey, 1983; Penn, Holyoak, & 
Povinelli, 2008). By contrast, prototypical knowledge, as any semantic knowledge, would 
enable people to determine the usage of tools, that is, in which context, in which location or 
with which object a given tool is commonly employed. This second form of knowledge 
would be particularly useful for adapting oneself to social usages in knowing, for example, 
that a toothbrush is appropriate for cleaning teeth and not shoes or that Japanese people use 
sticks and not forks and knives to eat.  
                                                                          
3 It is noteworthy that we do not refer here to the difficulties observed in actual tool use because of 
motor apraxia, but those difficulties that are due to conceptual impairment and which appear later in 
the disease (see below). 
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In line with this proposal, it can be predicted that patients with a selective semantic deficit 
and, as a result, impaired prototypical knowledge, should meet difficulties to demonstrate 
how tools presented in isolation (pantomime, use of tools in isolation) are usually used. 
Recently, we brought evidence for this prediction by describing the case of the patient MJC 
who had a severe semantic impairment (matching picture tasks) following closed head 
injury (Osiurak et al., 2008). This patient was unable to demonstrate the use of tools 
presented in isolation. Very interestingly, MJC used almost systematically the desk to show 
the use of tools, as she attempted to bring out mechanical relationships from the desk and 
the tools. For instance, she used a key to for scrapping the chamfered edge of the wooden 
desk or a screwdriver as a gimlet, adding that “one can make a hole with it”. Nevertheless, 
MJC performed normally when asked to use tools presented with their corresponding 
objects and was even able to use tools in a non-conventional way to the extent that these 
tools were present with a given object (see above). Somewhat similar strategies were also 
reported by Sirigu et al. (1991) who described a patient (FB) with bitemporal lobe lesions 
caused by herpetic encephalitis. FB was unable to recognize many familiar tools and objects, 
but could describe how these tools could be manipulated. For instance, when asked to 
identify a nail clipper, he said that “it can attach several sheets of paper together. You turn 
the piece on the top and tip it back…You press and it maintains them” (Sirigu et al., 1991, p. 
2566). Recent works on patients with semantic dementia have also shown a strong 
association between semantic picture matching tasks and the use of isolated tools (Hodges 
et al., 2000; Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). 
In sum, these findings reveal that the actual use of tools presented in isolation – and 
therefore production of pantomimes to command or to the sight of tools – poses serious 
problems to patients with semantic impairment4. Interestingly, these patients tend to 
employ a compensatory strategy consisting in using the immediate environment in order to 
bring out possible actions which are, as a result, not necessarily the actions usually carried 
out with the tools. This can be easily explained by the preservation of practical knowledge. 
Of course, we are not saying that the human brain would contain semantic, prototypical 
knowledge whose main purpose would be to enable patients to show how an isolated tool 
can be used. As discussed above, prototypical knowledge may be particularly relevant for 
adapting oneself to social situations, but also to retrieve tools that are not immediately 
present to the senses. After all, knowledge about the fact that nails can generally be found in 
a workshop enables people to seek the tool necessary for completing the current action in 
the appropriate place. But, in the clinical context, the involvement of prototypical 
knowledge might be more pronounced when patients are asked to demonstrate the use of 
isolated tools. Note that this also requires examining whether the performance improves 
when the corresponding object is given. If such improvement occurs along with difficulties 
in semantic picture matching tasks, then the hypothesis of a selective semantic impairment 
can be reasonably formulated.  
The evaluation of semantic disorders we propose here differs from the classical, cognitive 
approach which focuses on the type of errors committed by patients to specify the nature of 
the deficit (e.g., content errors would be specific to semantic impairment). However, we 
think that this way of addressing apraxia is delicate because it is generally very hard to 
                                                                          
4 Note that the distinction we make here between the use of tools in isolation versus with the 
corresponding object does not appear in the cognitive models discussed above. 
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distinguish content errors from other types of errors. Our way of assessing the impairment 
is simpler and is based on the conjunction of the deficits observed in a patient on several 
different tasks (Table 1). Moreover, it is noteworthy that semantic impairment could be 
found more frequently in patients with bilateral or left temporal lobe lesions, that is, in 
patients with cortical degeneration (semantic dementia or Alzheimer’s disease) or after 
vascular lesions of these areas.  
 
Task 
Production 
system 
(motor apraxia) 
Conceptual system 
Prototypical 
knowledge 
Practical 
knowledge 
Topographical 
knowledge 
about body parts 
Sequence of finger 
movements 
Impaired Normal Normal Normal 
Functional picture 
matching 
Normal Impaired Normal Normal 
Use of isolated tools 
Impaired 
manipulation 
Impaired Impaired Normal 
Use of tools with 
corresponding objects 
Impaired 
manipulation 
Normal Impaired Normal 
Selection of the correct 
tools and use of it with a 
given object 
Impaired 
manipulation 
Normal Impaired Normal 
Mechanical problem 
solving 
Impaired 
manipulation 
Normal Impaired Normal 
Imitation of meaningless 
hand postures 
Quasi-normal Normal Normal Impaired 
Imitation of meaningless 
finger postures 
Impaired Normal Normal Normal 
The distinction we make here between production system versus conceptual system is not based on the 
different cognitive models presented in this chapter since none of them suggests that the conceptual 
system would contain prototypical knowledge, practical knowledge and topographical knowledge 
about body parts. Rather, this distinction corresponds to a synthesis of the works presented here. 
Table 1. Examination of apraxia 
With regard to the neuroanatomical loci of damage associated with impaired practical 
knowledge, it is interesting to note that many works have pointed out that anomalous tool 
use is generally present in patients with large bilateral or left fronto-parieto-temporal lobe 
lesions (Fukutake, 2008; Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano, & Shallice, 2001), even though it is not 
systematic (Halsband et al., 2000). In this study, five patients with circumscribed lesions of 
the left parietal cortex did not encounter any difficulty to use tools. In fact, De Renzi and 
Lucchelli (1988) had already indicated that IA was not systematically present in patients 
with parietal lobe lesions. More recently, Goldenberg and Hagmann (1998) examined the 
ability to use tools in LBD patients. They did not find any association between tool use 
performance and specific brain areas. In a more recent study, Goldenberg and Spatt (2009) 
asked 38 LBD patients to perform a familiar tool use test as well as a mechanical problem 
www.intechopen.com
 Apraxia: Clinical Types, Theoretical Models, and Evaluation 
 
83 
solving task. The correlational analysis between the scores and the lesional sites indicated 
that left parietal and frontal, but not temporal areas played a significant role in the two 
tasks. In total, it appears that the left parietal lobe might store practical knowledge, although 
more extended lesions of the left hemisphere and even of the right hemisphere could be 
necessary for the emergence of clinically observable difficulties. So, impaired practical 
knowledge might be more frequent in diseases causing lesions in these areas (stroke, some 
degenerative diseases such as the cortico-basal degeneration at advanced stage or 
Alzheimer’s disease).  
4.2 Imitation of meaningless gestures 
The multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis assumes that there would be a non-lexical, direct 
route between early visual centres and motor centres. This proposal has been supported by 
observations of patients with a visuo-imitative apraxia, that is, a specific or at least more 
pronounced deficit of imitation of meaningless gestures (Mehler, 1987; Ochipa et al., 1994). 
Several studies have however questioned the existence of this direct route.  
Goldenberg (1995) asked 35 LBD patients, 20 RBD patients and 20 healthy subjects to imitate 
meaningless hand postures as well as to replicate the gestures on a life-sized manikin. All 
the postures involved the face. The results indicated that LBD patients performed 
dramatically worse than RBD patients and controls on both tests. In another study, 
Goldenberg and Hagmann (1997) reported two patients (LK and EN) with left inferior 
parietal lobe lesions (angular gyrus) who were also severely impaired at imitating these 
postures as well as replicating on the manikin. On the basis of these findings, Goldenberg 
and Hagmann (1997; see also Goldenberg, 1997) suggested that imitation of meaningless 
hand postures is not based on a direct route between perception and action, but might be 
rather mediated by general topographical knowledge about the human body.  
Goldenberg and Hagmann (1997) also developed a task of imitation of meaningless finger 
postures and showed that EN but not LK failed this test. This distinction was quite 
surprising given that until this work no neuropsychologist had focused on a possible 
distinction between imitation of hand versus finger postures. In fact, the evaluation was 
generally based on a composite score obtained from the two conditions (e.g., De Renzi, 
Motti, & Nichelli, 1980). Goldenberg (1999) examined 26 LBD patients, 21 RBD patients and 
17 healthy subjects on imitation as well as matching of meaningless hand and finger 
postures. He found that LBD patients performed worse than RBD patients for hand posture 
imitation and matching, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for finger postures. So, 
he concluded that imitation and matching of hand postures would be based on 
topographical knowledge about body parts and would involve the left parietal lobe. Indeed, 
given that the hand is in contact with the face, the patient does not see the posture he/she is 
carrying out. So, the ability to execute such gestures needs knowledge about body parts and 
notably the face (knowing that the extremity of the hand must be in contact with the nose 
implies being able to distinguish the nose from other parts of the face). By contrast, imitation 
and matching of finger postures would be based on visuo-spatial skills supported by the 
right posterior cerebral hemisphere. Indeed, the reproduction of finger postures requires 
visual guidance in order to represent the position of each finger relative to the others. The 
involvement of topographical knowledge about body parts is here largely limited. These 
conclusions were corroborated by more recent neuroimaging studies conducted in healthy 
subjects (Hermsdörfer et al., 2001; see also Goldenberg, Laimgruber, & Hermsdörfer, 2001).  
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Besides challenging the relevance of the multiple-routes-for-action hypothesis and notably 
the existence of the non-lexical, direct route, these findings more generally challenged the 
interest of proposing a unique cognitive model of apraxia accounting for tool use and 
imitation impairment. Note also that the works by Goldenberg, as those mentioned above 
about the distinction between the use of tools in isolation versus with the corresponding 
object, shed a new light on the evaluation of apraxia, in stressing that even if situations may 
appear quite similar, subtle modifications in the material used can lead to observe very 
different disorders. Consequently, the distinction demonstrated by Goldenberg between 
finger versus hand postures must be taken into consideration in the clinical assessment of 
apraxia (Table 1). Finally, it is noteworthy that the association observed by Goldenberg 
between imitation of meaningless hand postures and the left inferior parietal lobe is 
inconsistent with the cognitive models discussed above. Indeed, in those models, the left 
inferior parietal region is thought to contain gesture engrams. Yet, other studies have 
confirmed the relationship obtained by Goldenberg. For instance, Haaland, Harrington, and 
Knight (2000) found that patients who were impaired at imitating meaningless hand 
postures generally had left inferior parietal lobe lesions (supramarginal gyrus and angular 
gyrus). Moreover, they also reported that errors concerning the position of the hand relative 
to the face were only present in patients with parietal lobe lesions whereas the errors 
concerning the position of the fingers relative to the others were rather present in patients 
with frontal damage and in only 60% of the patients with parietal lobe lesions (see also 
Goldenberg & Karnath, 2006). 
4.3 Pantomime production, actual tool use and gesture engrams 
The cognitive models discussed above, with the exception of Roy and Square’s (1985), 
suggest that knowledge about tool manipulation are supported by gesture engrams. Quite 
surprisingly, damage to these engrams would not cause significant difficulties in actual tool 
use, because physical constraints inherent to tools and objects could be sufficient to guide 
the utilization. The corollary is that damage to gesture engrams mainly affects the 
production of pantomimes. If it can be thought that the clinical tasks, even if they are often 
not ecological, may be relevant for revealing impairment, it can nevertheless seem 
somewhat surprising to consider that the major role of these representations would be to 
support pantomime production, namely, a situation people meet very rarely in real life. In 
order to solve this theoretical curiosity, it has been suggested that damage to gesture 
engrams might cause subtle manipulation errors during actual tool use and that these errors 
might occur conjointly with the errors observed in pantomime production (Clark et al., 1994; 
Rothi et al., 1991). In line with this prediction, Clark et al. (1994; see also Poizner, Clark, 
Merians, & Macauley, 1995) asked 3 apraxic LBD patients to carry out the action “slicing 
bread” in 4 conditions: No cues (verbal command only), object present (bread), tool present 
(knife) and both object and tool present (bread and knife). Gestures were recorded and 
submitted to kinematic analyses. Results indicated that patients showed disturbances in 
planning the movement of the hand in space across the 4 conditions. These findings were 
thought as providing evidence for the existence of gesture engrams. 
These results are however to be considered with caution because of several methodological 
limitations. For example, the size of the patient sample was relatively weak and could not 
allow the use of statistical correlations between the errors observed in the 4 conditions. More 
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recently, Hermsdörfer, Hentze, and Goldenberg. (2006; see also Goldenberg, Hentze, & 
Hermsdörfer, 2004) replicated this experiment by asking 9 apraxic LBD patients to carry out 
the action “sawing a piece of wood” in 3 conditions: Pantomime (visual presentation of the 
saw), pantomime with a bar shaped like the handle of the saw, and actual sawing. Gestures 
were recorded and submitted to kinematic analyses. Results revealed that, patients executed 
large proportions of their pantomiming movements in an incorrect direction away from the 
appropriate anteroposterior direction. The availability of the handle-like bar did not 
improve performance. During actual use, patients moved with moderately decreased 
velocity. However, this deficit was not related to the errors in movement direction 
characteristic of pantomiming, suggesting that pantomime and actual tool use are dictated 
by different requirements and constraints. In broad terms, unlike Clark et al. (1994), 
manipulation errors during actual tool use do not occur conjointly with the errors observed 
in pantomime production. 
On the basis of these findings, it appears that the gesture engram hypothesis fails to explain 
how people use tools or produce pantomimes. Again, that these models primarily focus on 
the ability to perform pantomimes may appear somewhat surprising as people carry out 
such actions quite occasionally in real life as compared to actual tool use. In fact, in line with 
the distinction made above between prototypical versus practical knowledge, another 
interpretation can be offered with regard to pantomime production. The demonstration by 
pantomime, like any other tool use situation, requires technical reasoning (see above) to 
create a representation of the action (the use of the tool). Unlike actual tool use, however, 
people have to carry out actions, while some of the components (the tool and/or the object) 
are not available to the senses. So, in a way similar to the use of isolated tools (see above), 
people have to form representations of these components from semantic/conceptual 
memory, putting high demands on storage and elaboration because the performance can be 
guided and controlled only with reference to these representations (Goldenberg, Hartmann, 
& Schlott, 2003; Roy & Hall, 1992). Moreover, in the context of pantomime, after the 
representation of the use is produced, it is still necessary to keep it in mind to convert into a 
pantomime the shape, movement and position of the acting hand via an affordance-
perception process (Bartolo, Cubelli, Della Sala, & Drei, 2003; Goldenberg et al., 2003; Roy & 
Hall, 1992). In short, the demonstration by pantomime would be a non-routine, creative 
task, consisting in the creation and the temporary storage of a representation of the use 
which then guides the movement. Note also that in line with the gesture engram hypothesis, 
disturbance in pantomime production should be accompanied by lesions of the left inferior 
parietal cortex. However, it has been demonstrated that it remains relatively hard to specify 
precise brain localisations associated with the performance of pantomime production 
(Alexander, Baker, Naeser, Kaplan, & Palumbo, 1992; Goldenberg, 2003; Goldenberg et al., 
2003; see also Goldenberg, 2009). 
To sum up, performance in pantomime tasks remain hard to interpret because of the 
involvement of a high number of cognitive processes. This may explain why pantomime 
production is frequently impaired after lesions in various areas of the left hemisphere 
(Goldenberg, 2003). Moreover, even if the use of three-dimensional motion recording 
systems or the development of procedure based on video-recording and multiple-judge 
techniques have allowed neuropsychologists to improve the measurement of movements in 
an objective way, these procedures remain very far from the reality of clinicians who 
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evaluate patients’ performance on the basis of their own experience and intuition (Le Gall, 
1992: Poeck, 1986). So, we advise employing pantomime tasks with caution and parsimony 
and we favour the use of other tasks involving the actual use of tools or imitation of 
meaningless postures.  
4.4 The independance of motor apraxia 
So far, we have focused on the conceptual facet of apraxic manifestations. In this section, we 
put an emphasis on “motor apraxia” also called “melo-kinetic apraxia” or “limb-kinetic 
apraxia”, corresponding with the other facet of the syndrome (production). 
Kleist (1907) was the first to describe the loss of hand and finger dexterity resulting from 
inability to isolate individual innervation. This lack of dexterity is generally confined to 
hand and finger movements contralateral to the lesion, regardless of the hemisphere which 
is damaged. The deficit can be distinguished from paresis because of preservation of power 
and sensation. Nevertheless, movements are awkward. Fruitless attempts commonly 
precede erroneous movements, which are frequently contaminated by extraneous 
movements. Importantly, the deficit is consistent, showing the same degree in activities of 
daily life. In other words, there is no voluntary-automatic dissociation. For Kleist (1907), this 
disorder reveals damage to innervatory patterns acquired with experience. He called this 
deficit “innervatory apraxia”.  
Denny-Brown (1958) provided an original way of conceiving of motor apraxia in 
distinguishing “frontal, magnetic apraxia” from “parietal, repellent apraxia”. The first type 
is characterised by prominence and persistence of instinctive grasping of the hands, the 
mouth and even the feet when they make contact or even merely when they are close to any 
object. Object manipulation can be impaired because patients do not open the hand wide 
enough when they take hold of an object. The magnetic, exploratory aspect of this behaviour 
in relation to the environment would be managed by the parietal cortex, released by frontal 
and temporal lobe lesions. The second type is characterized by avoiding reaction and 
levitation of the extremities. Similarly, object manipulation may be impaired because of 
overextension when patients attempt to pick up of grasp objects. The repellent bias to 
behaviour would be determined by a strip of cerebral cortex in the premotor region and 
released by parietal lobe damage. These two types of apraxia are unilateral and can generate 
problems in bimanual activities or in tasks requiring the coordination of the two “hemi-
bodies”. Denny-Brown stressed the functional independence of these forms of apraxia from 
conceptual skills. He reported, for instance, the observation of a patient unable to correctly 
grasp a pair of scissors, but could cut up a piece of paper if it was helped to correctly grasp 
the pair of scissors.  
Interestingly, this observation points out the severe difficulties that patients with motor 
apraxia can encounter when they have to carry out distal movements involving a precise 
positioning of the fingers. In another study, Sirigu et al. (1995) also reported disturbances in 
the ability to adequately grasp tools to actually use them in a patient with bilateral superior 
parietal lobe lesions. Nevertheless, when the examiner helped this patient to correctly grasp 
the tool, the demonstration was performed properly.  
Motor apraxia has received a resurgence of interest in recent years with the study of patients 
with cortico-basal degeneration. This disease is characterized by an akinetic-rigid syndrome 
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accompanied by asymmetric, lateralizing cortical signs including alien limb behaviour, 
sensory loss and apraxia (Gibb, Luthert, & Marsden, 1989; see also Zadikoff & Lang, 2005). 
Imaging studies have revealed the presence of frontoparietal cortical atrophy, which is most 
notable contralateral to the most severely affected side. Two types of apraxia are present in 
patients with cortico-basal degeneration: Motor apraxia and IMA. Some patients can also 
show signs of IA, but this kind of apraxia would appear later in the disease (Gibb et al., 
1989; Leiguarda, Lees, Merello, Starkstein, & Marsden, 1994). While a significant number of 
patients have a bilateral IMA (pantomime to command or on imitation; see Zadikoff & Lang, 
2005), IMA is generally unilateral at early stages of the disease. This questions the 
independence of IMA from motor apraxia given that this latter is specifically unilateral. 
As Kleist (1907) suggested, the severity of motor apraxia is more pronounced in distal than 
proximal movements, and can be readily observed in tasks requiring the coordination of 
finger movements in actual tool use or imitation of gestures (Leiguarda & Marsden, 2000; 
Zadikoff & Lang, 2005). One effective way of assessing motor apraxia is to ask patients to 
carry out sequence of finger movements (1-4-2-4). Nevertheless, this task as any other task is 
certainly not supported only on the production system and can also be failed, for example, 
by patients with visuo-spatial deficits (see above). So, the best way to determine the 
presence of motor apraxia remains to examine whether impairment is constant across the 
tasks. For example, in order to isolate motor apraxia from other disorders during tool use, 
we advise first examining whether the patient does not have impaired practical knowledge 
by asking him/her first to select among several tools (hammer, key, saw) the appropriate 
one to be used with a given object (nail). If the choice is correct, then this implies that the 
patient is still able to correctly reason about the physical properties of tools and objects and, 
as a result, to form an appropriate representation of the action. And, if the patient shows 
severe difficulties to manipulate the tool to show its use with the object, then it is very likely 
that the patient has a motor apraxia. In sum, we agree with Foix (1916) who challenged the 
idea that tool use impairment is based on damage to motor representations. For him, IA was 
due to a general intellectual deficit and motor apraxia was the only form of apraxia. For us, 
IA was rather due to the inability to do technical reasoning (see above).  
5. Conclusion 
As mentioned above, the study of apraxia has been subject to intense debate, particularly 
with regard to its independence from other cognitive processes. The emergence of cognitive 
models has contributed to the idea that damage to sensorimotor representations (gesture 
engrams) would be central to apraxia and particularly IMA. Recent findings have however 
shed a new light on this issue, suggesting that the debate is far from being resolved. As Foix 
(1916) and Morlass (1928) thought, there might be only one form of apraxia, that is, motor 
apraxia, the other types of apraxia being nothing else than the manifestations of conceptual 
disorders in gesture production. After all, when a patient fails an episodic memory test by 
pointing the wrong word, this gestural error is not characterized as apraxic. Likewise, a 
patient who is impaired at performing the Tower of London Test may also be considered as 
expressing manipulation errors. Yet, nobody would consider that this patient is apraxic. So, 
the question remains to understand what the arguments are leading neuropsychologists to 
still think that the difficulties observed in actual tool use is necessarily due to damage to 
sensorimotor representations. 
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The framework we offer here allows renewing the assessment of disorders which are 
generally viewed as apraxia. We have given examples concerning the evaluation of practical 
versus prototypical knowledge. Importantly, the evaluation we advise lies in the principle 
that it is necessary to escape from the assessment of the quality of movements per se, and 
rather to view disorders as the manifestation of a deficit that is constant across the tasks. 
This is not to say that the observation of the gestures executed by patients do not provide 
any information concerning the disease. If the difficulties are indeed constant across several 
gestural tasks, then it is very likely that the patient has a motor apraxia (Table 1). But, 
expected from motor apraxia, the focus must not be placed on the movement executed but 
rather on the nature of the task which is failed (actual tool use, imitation). 
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